Human Consciousness:
Integrating Phenomenology and Cognitive Science
Report to the Fetzer Institute
on the Symposium held at Seasons, September 24-27, 1999
[Abridged Version for Internet]
Prepared by
Evan Thompson, Ph.D.
© Evan Thompson & the Fetzer Institute, 1999
The presentations and discussions during the symposium focused mainly on intersubjectivity and empathy as seen from the vantage points of cognitive science and Phenomenology (Points 1 & 2 above). There was less discussion of the contemplative and meditative perspective (Point 3), due in part to the last-minute cancellation of Dr. Margaret Donaldson, whose work provides the bridge in my report from cognitive science and Phenomenology to meditative psychology. Thus the transition from intersubjective consciousness to interbeing still needs to be explored more fully.
I opened the meeting with a keynote address in which I set out a provisional framework for the issues to be discussed (the text of this lecture is attached as an appendix to this report). My guiding question was:
If we are to have a cognitively and ethically satisfying understanding of consciousness, what form must this understanding take?
I then proposed two key points, which I termed the Core Dyad:
These two points are related in the form of a circle: On the one hand, consciousness as an object of scientific study is an abstraction from the mutual empathetic understanding we human beings have of each other in our day-to-day lived-experience. On the other hand, this mutual empathetic understanding is part of our natural evolutionary heritage and can be studied as such by biology and cognitive science.
On the basis of these two points, I proposed that the foundational issue for consciousness studies is the problem of how to put together in a nonreductive and mutually illuminating way the naturalistic perspective of empirical science and the personalistic perspective of human experience. Phenomenologythe disciplined examination of human lived-experiencewas proposed as the bridge between these two perspectives.
With this framework in place, a number of common themes emerged during the symposium from the presentations and subsequent discussions. These themes can be divided into two categories: (1) foundational issues; and (2) ethical implications and practical applications.
These foundational issues led naturally to a number of issues about ethical implications and practical applications, especially in medical or clinical contexts.
Among the invited presentations, two stand out as being of special relevance to the work of the Fetzer Institutethose of S. Kay Toombs and Jonathan Cole. Both talks are relevant to the Fetzer Institutes programs in science on psychosocial and spiritual effects on health, on complementary and alternative medicine, as well as its program in education on relationship-centered care.
Prof. Toombs spoke on empathy as the basis for understanding the lived-experience of illness. She discussed how Phenomenology is essential for bridging the gap between science and experience in the context of the doctor-patient relationship, and on how the physicians capacity for empathetic understanding can be enhanced through specific embodied practices, such as mindfulness meditation, and through the training of empathetic listening to narratives of illness experience.
Dr. Cole spoke about his research on clinical pathologies of facial expression and perception. He discussed how our very sense of self is constituted in the face, and experienced in the interaction between faces, and how pathologies disrupt this experience in various ways. He also showed that these pathologies cannot be adequately understood without phenomenological narratives of first-person experience.
Summary of Symposium Presentations Following is a brief synopsis of the main points made by the invited speakers in their presentations (not including Evan Thompson: see Appendix 3 for the text of his keynote address).
(1) We need to construct generative passages between cognitive science and phenomenology. These are pathways that lead from cognitive science to phenomenology and from phenomenology to cognitive science. Cognitive scientific studies of the brain are scientifically incomplete without the inclusion of phenomenological data from first-person experience. Hence the science of consciousness needs to be a multinaturalism that encompasses a plurality of first-person, second-person, and third-person methods of research. (2) These points were illustrated by the case of experiencing another on the basis of his or her bodily presence, and the neural substrates for such experience in so-called mirror neurons (neurons that respond both to self-initated, goal-directed actions, such as grasping an object, and to the perception of the same actions as performed by another).
(1) Phenomenology studies forms of possible experiencepossible perceptions, memories, and so onrather than actual individual experiences. In so doing it tries to uncover the invariant form or essence of experienceswhat makes a perception a perceptual experience rather than a memory, for example. (2) In the case of empathy, we do not have direct access to other peoples experiences; we represent them to ourselves on the basis of their perceived bodily expression and on imagining how things look from their perspective. (3) There is an asymmetry of access to the data between phenomenology and cognitive science: phenomenology has access to first-person subjective data, whereas cognitive science has access only to public, objective data. The role of phenomenology in relation to science, therefore, is to interpret the findings of science from a first-person perspective.
(1) The body-part we feel most embodied in is the face. (2) The face is not simply an expression of a self that others can see, because our very sense of self is constituted in the face, and experienced in the interaction between faces. (3) Certain sorts of mental states are directly percievable in facial expression. (4) Clinical studies of pathologies of facial experience reveal the centrality of the face to ordinary self-experience, and these pathologies cannot be adequately understood without phenomenological narratives of first-person experience.
(1) A distinction needs to be drawn between body image and body schema. The former is ones conscious image of ones body; the latter is ones largely unconscious set of perceptual and motor capacities. (2) Clinical studies with a patient who has lost all proprioceptive sensibility show that body image and body schema can be functionally dissociated. (3) Body image and body schema are central examples of the kind of phenomena that need to be understood through an integrated phenomenological and cognitive scientific perspective.
(1) Phenomenology is essential for bridging the gap between science and experience in the context of the doctor-patient relationship. (2) Empathy provides a direct basis for grasping the experience of illness-as-lived. (3) The physicians capacity for empathetic understanding can be enhanced through specific embodied practices, such as mindfulness meditation, and through the training of empathetic listening to narratives of illness experience.
(1) Husserlian phenomenology enables us to distinguish several different sorts of intersubjectivity: (i) the perception of another; (ii) self-alterity, the experience of ones self as Other, for example in memory or imagination; (iii) self-alteration, the dynamic unfolding of the ego in time as inhabited by the Other. (2) Husserlian phenomenology also enables us to distinguish several different sorts of empathetic coupling between self and other: (i) the passive association of my lived-body with the lived-body of the Other; (ii) the putting of oneself in the place of the Other in imagination; (iii) the interpretation or understanding of myself as an Other for you; (iv) ethical responsibility in the face of the Other. (3) The phenomenological perspective is one of transcendental empiricismlived-experience of necessity is where we start from and return to, and therefore has primacy over scientific abstractions, but at the same time always depends on various material and formal preconditions to which we have no immediate access.
(1) It is important to distinguish between a number of different possible senses of intersubjectivity: (i) as a contingent, social superstructure of individuals; (ii) as constitutive of the very nature of consciousness; (iii) as the inherent openness of embodied consciousness to the Other. (2) The main philosophical and phenomenological issue about intersubjectivity is whether the second or third sense is the right one. (3) Empathy occurs mainly in concrete bodily encounters with others and has for its precondition the inherent openness of embodied consciousness to the Other.
(1) If one carefully considers the world as understood by physics, one will see that there is actually no gap between the third-person perspective of physics and the first-person perspective of consciousness, because the very notion of what is physical refers back to the first-person, or to a proto-first-person perspective.
(1) Chimpanzees and bonobos are not only empathetic among themselves, but there can be rich dimensions of interspecies human-animal empathetic understanding. (2) Bonobos have to be seen not simply as another animal species similar to us in certain respects, but as bonobo people.