Other Related Bibliographies

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Journal: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.

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Baumgartner, Elisabeth, et al. (Eds.). 1996. Phenomenology and Cognitive Science: Handbook Dettelbach, Germany: Josef H. Roll.

Baynes, Tim. 2003 (preprint). Closing the Gap? Some Questions for Neurophenomenology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.

Baynes, Tim and David Chalmers. 2003 (preprint). What is the unity of consciousness?. In A. Cleeremans (ed.) The Unity of Consciousness: Binding, Integration and Dissociation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bermœdez, J. 1999. Nonconceptual self-awareness and the paradox of self-consciousness. in Das Selbst und seine neurobiologischen Grundlagen, hg. von Albert Newen und Kai Vogeley. MENTIS.

Bitbol, M. 2002. Science as if situation mattered. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1, 181-224.

Borrelli, Eugenio. 2001. Bibliography and other resources on phenomenology and cognitive science.

Borrett, Donald, Sean Kelly, and Hon Kwan. 2000. Phenomenology, dynamical neural networks and brain function. Philosophical Psychology, 13: 213-266

Braddock, G. 2000. Naturalized Phenomenology: Online Sources

Braddock, G. 2001. Beyond reflection in naturalized phenomenology. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8 (11): 3-16.

Brockman, John. 1995. The Emergent Self (Francisco Varela). In The Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific Revolution. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Brown, Steven. 1999. Beyond the fringe: James, Gurwitsch, and the conscious horizon. Journal of Mind and Behavior, 20(2):211-227.

Carruthers, Peter. 2000. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (ISBN: 0521781736).

Chalmers, David. 2001. First-person methods in the science of consciousness.

Cohen, Amy E. & Varela, Francisco J. 2000. Facing Up to the Embarrassment: The practice of subjectivity in neuroscientific and psychoanalytic experience. J E P - Number 10-11.

Cole, Jonathan, Gallagher, S. and McNeill, D. 2002. Gesture following deafferentation: A phenomenologically informed experimental study. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1 (1) 49-67. (Abstract)

Cole,Jonathan, Oliver Sacks, and Ian Waterman. 2000. "On the immunity principle: a view from a robot (preprint)." Trends in Cognitive Science 4, No. 5: 167.

Cole, Jonathan, Gallagher, Shaun., McNeill, David., Duncan S., Furuyama, N. and McCullough, K-E. 1998. Gestures after total deafferentation of the bodily and spatial senses (preprint). 1998. OralitŽ et gestualitŽ: Communication multi-modale, interaction. Eds. Santi et al, Paris: L. Harmattan: pp. 65-69.

Dennett, Daniel. 2001. The fantasy of first-person science. A debate with David Chalmers, held at Northwestern University, Evanston, IL,. February 15, 2001.

Dennett, Daniel. 2000. Are we explaining consciousness yet?.

Depraz, Natalie. 2001. La conscience: Approches croisŽes: Des classiques aux sciences cognitives.. Paris: Armand Colin.

Depraz, Natalie. 2001. LuciditŽ du corps: Pour un empirisme transcendantal en phŽnomŽnologie. Kluwer Academic Publications

Depraz, Natalie and Shaun Gallagher. 2002. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences: Editorial Introduction. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1 (1): 1-6.

Depraz, Natalie, Francisco Varela, and Pierre Vermersch. 2000. The gesture of awareness: An account of its structural dynamics. In M. Velmans (ed). Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. pp. 121-136.

Depraz, N., F. Varela, and P. Vermersch. (2003). On Becoming Aware: Steps to a Phenomenological Pragmatics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Dourish, Paul. 2001. Where the Action Is: The Foundations of Embodied Interaction. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Dreyfus, Hubert, L. 1998. "Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Mental Representation: The Relevance of Phenomenology to Scientific Explanation Intelligence Without Representation." Houston Studies in Cognitive Science.

Dreyfus, Hubert L. (1996), 'The current relevance of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of embodiment', The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 4, Special Issue: Existential Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, edited by Mark Wrathall and Sean Kelly, np.

Dreyfus, Hubert, L. and H. Hall, (eds). 1982. Husserl: Intentionality, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge: MIT Press, Bradford Books)

Dreyfus, Hubert L. 1972. What computers can't do: a critique of artificial reason. New York, Harper and Row.

Dreyfus, Hubert L. 1992. What computers still can't do: a critique of artificial reason. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gallagher, S. 2005. How the Body Shapes the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Gallagher, S. 2004. Neurocognitive models of schizophrenia: A phenomenological critique. Psychopathology 37: 8-19 (with a response by Christopher Frith, "Comments on Shaun Gallagher." Psychopathology, 37 [2004]: 20-22.).

Gallagher, S. 2004. Hermeneutics and the cognitive sciences Graduate Student Association Lecture, Department of Elementary Education, University of Alberta, Edmonton (March 2002). Revised 2003. Forthcoming in Journal of Consciousness Studies. Chinese translation (2004), trans. Y. C. Deng, Journal of East China Normal University 22 (1): 34-42.

Gallagher, S. 2003. Phenomenological contributions to a theory of social cognition. The Aron Gurwitsch Memorial Lecture. Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Boston, November 2003. Forthcoming in Husserl Studies.

Gallagher, S. 2003. Bodily self-awareness and object-perception. Theoria et Historia Scientiarum: International Journal for Interdisciplinary Studies, 7 (1) - in press. (The original version was presented as "Non-perceptual self-awareness," Colloquium: Phenomenological and Experimental Approaches to Cognition, CREA, Paris [June 2000]).

Gallagher, S. 2001. Review of What Makes Us Think? : A Neuroscientist and a Philosopher Argue about Ethics, Human Nature, and the Brain, by Jean-Pierre Changeux and Paul Ricoeur. Metapsychology (2001).

Gallagher, S. 2000. "Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science (preprint)," Trends in Cognitive Science 4, No. 1: 14-21. This is followed up by my "Reply to Cole, Sacks, and Waterman (preprint)," Trends in Cognitive Science 4, No. 5 (2000): 167-68, a reply to a comment on my original article by Jonathan Cole, Oliver Sacks, and Ian Waterman. 2000. "On the immunity principle: a view from a robot (preprint)." Trends in Cognitive Science 4, No. 5: 167.

Gallagher, Shaun. 1999. Self-Reference and Schizophrenia: A Cognitive Model of Immunity to Error through Misidentification (preprint). In Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-experience. Ed. Dan Zahavi (Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins) 201-239.

Gallagher, Shaun. 1999. A Cognitive Way to the Transcendental Reduction. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6: 348-51.

Gallagher, S. 1999. "Reflexive access and problems with introspection." Online Commentary, The Investigation of Conscious Emotion: Combining First-Person and Third-Person Methodologies, University of Arizona.

Gallagher, Shaun. 1998. The Inordinance of Time (Evanston: Northwestern University Press)

Gallagher, Shaun. 1997. Mutual Enlightenment: Recent Phenomenology in Cognitive Science. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4, No. 3: 195-214.

Gallagher, Shaun. 1995. Body Schema and Intentionality. In The Body and the Self, eds. JosŽ Bermœdez, Naomi Eilan, and Anthony Marcel (Cambridge: MIT/Bradford Press), pp. 225-244.

Gallagher, S. and Jonathan Cole. 1995. Body Schema and Body Image in a Deafferented Subject (preprint) Journal of Mind and Behavior, 16 (1995), 369-390.

Gallagher, S. and Depraz, N. 2003. Embodiment and awareness. Perspectives from phenomenology and cognitive science. Special Issue of Theoria et Historia Scientiarum, 7 (1).

Gallagher, S. and Anthony J. Marcel. 1999. The Self in Contextualized Action. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (4): 4-30.

Gallagher, S. and Andrew Meltzoff. 1996. "The Earliest Sense of Self and Others: Merleau-Ponty and Recent Developmental Studies (preprint)," Philosophical Psychology 9, No. 2: 213-236.

Gallagher, S. and M. Sasma. 2003. Phenomenology and neurophenomenology: An Interview. May 15, 2003 following Gallagher's Hebdomades Lectures at the Philosophy Department of the Univerzita PalackŽho v Olomouci, Czech Republic.

Gallagher, S. and F. Varela. (2001). Redrawing the map and resetting the time: Phenomenology and the cognitive sciences (a .pdf file). In The Reach of Reflection: The Future of Phenomenology, ed. Steven Crowell, Lester Embree and Samuel J. Julian. Electronpress. Electronic Publication. A hard-copy version of this paper will be published in Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2003).

Gallagher, S. and Zahavi, D. 2005. Phenomenological approaches to self-consciousness. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Gazzaniga, Michael and Shaun Gallagher. 1998. The neuronal Platonist. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 ( 5/6): 706-17.

Gurwitsch, A. 1943. "William James' theory of the 'transitive parts' of the stream of consciousness." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 3: 449-477.

Gurwitsch, A. 1964. The field of consciousness. Pittsburgh, PA, Duquesne University Press.

Gurwitsch, A. 1966. Studies in phenomenology and psychology. Evanston, IL, Northwestern University Press.

Gurwitsch, A. 1985. Marginal consciousness. Athens, OH, Ohio University Press.

Hut, Piet., 1999. Exploring Actuality through Experiment and Experience, in Toward a Science of Consciousness III, eds. S.R. Hameroff, A.W. Kaszniak, and D.J. Chalmers (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press), pp. 391-405. Postscript version.

Hut, Piet., 1999. Theory and Experiment in Philosophy. J. of Consciousness. Studies. 6, No. 2-3, pp. 241-244.

Hut, Piet., 1999. The Role of the Subject in Science. in Proceedings of the State of the World Forum (1998)

Hut, Piet. 1996. Structuring reality: the role of limits, in Boundaries and Barriers, eds. J. Casti and A. Karlqvist (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley), pp. 148-187. PostScript version

Hut, P. & van Fraassen, B. 1997, Elements of Reality: A Dialogue. J. of Consciousness. Studies. 4, 167-180. Postscript version

Hut, P., Goodwin, B., & Kauffman, S. 1999. Complexity and Functionality: A Search for the Where, the When, and the How. Proceedings of the International Conference on Complex Systems, Nashua, N.H., 21-26 Sept. 1997 (Oxford University Press). Postscript version.

Hut, P. & Shepard, R. 1996. Turning `The Hard Problem' Upside Down & Sideways. J. of Consciousness. Studies. 3, 313-329; reprinted in Explaining Consciousness , ed. J. Shear (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press), pp. 305-322. PostScript version

James, William (1890), The Principles of Psychology (New York: Dover, 1950)

Jeannerod, M. and S. Gallagher. (2002). From action to interaction: An interview with Marc Jeannerod. Journal of Consciousness Studies, (in press). The journal version includes an Introduction and Postscript. A pre-print and more complete version of the actual interview, but without the Introduction and Postscript, is available as an Institut des Sciences Cognitives Working Paper (2001-4), Institut des Sciences Cognitives, Lyon, France.( http://www.isc.cnrs.fr/wp/wp01-4.htm). Citation and quotations should be from the journal version.

Kelly, Sean. Forthcoming in 2000. The Relevance of Phenomenology to the Philosophy of Language and Mind, (New York: Garland Press).

Kelly, Sean. (in press). On what we see: the phenomenology and analysis of perceptual experience. Philosophical Topics.

Kelly, Sean. 2000. Grasping at straws: motor intentionality and the cognitive science of skillful action, in Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus - Vol. II, Mark Wrathall and Jeff Malpas (eds.), (Cambridge: MIT Press, forthcoming in July 2000).

Kelly, Sean. 2000. "Phenomenology, neural networks, and brain function," (with Donald Borrett and Han Kwan) target article with open peer commentaries in Philosophical Psychology, vol. 13, no. 2, June 2000.

Kelly, Sean. 2000. "Bridging embodied cognition and brain function: the role of phenomenology," (with Borrett and Kwan) response to commentators in Philosophical Psychology, vol. 13, no. 2, June 2000.

Lutz, A. 2002. Toward a neurophenomenology as an account of generative passages: A first empirical case study. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 1 (2).

Lyons, William (1986), The Disappearance of Introspection (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, Bradford Books)

MacLennan, Bruce J. (1995). The investigation of consciousness through phenomenology and neuroscience. In King, Joseph and Pribram, Karl H., Eds. Proceedings Scale in Conscious Experience: Third Appalachian Conference on Behavioral Neurodynamics, pp. 23-43, Radford, Virginia.

Marbach, Eduard (1993), Mental Representation and Consciousness : Towards a Phenomenological Theory of Representation and Reference (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic)

Marcel, Anthony J. (1983), 'Conscious and unconscious perception: An approach to the relations between phenomenal experience and perceptual processes', Cognitive Psychology. 15, pp. 238-300.

McClamrock, Ron (1995), Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press)

McClamrock, Ron. 1994. Irreducibility and Subjectivity. Philosophical Studies. 1994.

McManus, Denis. 1999. The Rediscovery of Heidegger's Worldly Subject by Analytic Philosophy of Science. The Monist, 82 (2): 324-346

Mensch, James. 1991. "Phenomenology and Artificial Intelligence: Husserl learns Chinese," Husserl Studies, 8: 107-127.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1962. Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul (Original publication: PhŽnomŽnologie de la perception. Paris: 1945)

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1963. The Structure of Behavior, trans. A. L. Fisher. Boston: Beacon Press (Original publication: La Structure du comportment. Paris: 1942).

Millikan, Ruth Garrett (1993), 'Content and vehicle', in Spatial Representation: Problems in Philosophy and Psychology, ed., Naomi Eilan, Rosaleen McCarthy, and Bill Brewer (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), pp. 256-268.

Mulligan, Kevin and Barry Smith. 1986. A Relational Theory of the Act, Topoi, 5/2: 115-30.

Mulligan, Kevin and Barry Smith. 1986.. A Husserlian Theory of Indexicality. Grazer Philosophische Studien, 28: 133-63.

Murray, Alan. 2001. Philosophy and the 'anteriority complex'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 1 (1) 27-47. (Abstract).

Neisser, Joseph Ulric. 1999. On the Use and Abuse of Dasein in Cognitive Science. The Monist, 82 (2): 347-361.

Nixon, Greg. 1999. A hermeneutic objection: Language and the inner view. Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol 6: 257-267.

No‘, Alva. 2002. Is perspectival self-consciousness nonconceptual? (.pdf file), The Philosophical Quarterly. 52 (207):185-194.

Okrent, Mark 1996. 'Why the mind isn't a program (But some digital computer might have a mind)', The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 4, Special Issue: Existential Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, edited by Mark Wrathall and Sean Kelly, np.

Overgaard, Morten. 2001. The Role of Phenomenological Reports in Experiments on Consciousness. Psycoloquy, 12 (029)

Pacherie, Elizabeth. 2001. Action theory Includes; Action theory bibliography and Online papers on action.

Pacherie, Elizabeth. 2001, etc. Online papers.

Paillard, Jacques. Bibliography and online texts.

Pachoud, B. 1995. Conceptions de l'intentionnalitŽ selon Husserl et selon J. Searle et leurs implications temporelles. Archives de philosophie, 58 (4): 549-62.

Petit, Jean-Luc. 1990. "PhŽnomŽnologie et sciences cognitives," Revue de l'Institut Catholique de Paris, 35 (July-September 1990) 113-134.

Petit, J-L. 1995. "L'Archeologie" de Husserl et les neurosciences. In "Sciences cognitives et phŽnomŽnologie", J. Petitot (ed). Archives de Philosophie 58: 589-602.

Petit, J-L. 1997. Les Neurosciences et la philosophie de l'action. Pr‚face de A. Berthoz Paris: Librairie philosophique J. Vrin.

Petit, J-L. 1999. Le langage est-il dans le cerveau? Intellectica, 2: 99-128.

Petit, J-L. 1999. L'esprit-cerveau est-il idŽaliste ? In MatiŠre pensante, Etudes historiques sur les conceptions matŽrialistes en philosophie de l'esprit. J-N Missa ‚d. Paris: Vrin -- Ann. de l'Inst. de Philosophie de l'Univ. de Bruxelles, pp. 151-169.

Petit, J-L. 1999. L'enracinement corporel de l'action. In L'analyse de la singularitŽ de l'action. J-M Barbier, ed. (pp. 133-145). Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Petit, J-L. 1999. Constitution by Movement: Husserl in light of recent neurobiological findings. In Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. J. Petitot, F. Varela, B. Pachoud, J-M Roy eds, Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, pp. 220-244.

Petit, J-L. 2000. Le dialogue avec les neurosciences: un regain d'actualitŽ pour la phŽnomŽnologie. In Une pensŽe et son site: l'ouvre philosophique de Jean-Toussaint Desanti. Actes du Coll. org. p. l'ENS de Fontenay-St Cloud et l'Univ. de Provence, Bastia, 5-7 juin 1997, G. Ravis-Giordani, G. Wormser eds, Paris. pp. 165-181.

Petit, J-L. 2000. (in press). La th‚orie husserlienne de la constitution comme programme de science cognitive. Revue de MŽtaphysique et de Morale

Petitot, J. (ed). 1990. Sciences cognitives: Quelques aspects problŽmatiques. Special issue of Revue de synthŽse, 4 (nos. 1 & 2).

Petitot, J. 1991. PhŽnomŽnologie et psychologie cognitive, Les Etudes philosophiques, 1.

Petitot, J. (ed). 1995. Sciences cognitives et phŽnomŽnologie. Special issue of Archives de philosophie, 58 (4): 529-631.

Petitot, J. 1994. Phénoménologie computationnelle et objectivité Morphologique. In La connaissance philosophique. Essais sur l'Ïuvrede Gilles-Gaston Granger, (J. Proust, E. Schwartz eds.), 213-248, Paris, PUF.

Petitot, J. 1994. Phenomenology of Perception, Qualitative Physics and Sheaf Mereology. In Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, Proceedings of the 16th International Wittgenstein Symposium (R. Casati, B. Smith, G. White eds), Vienna, Verlag Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, 387-408.

Petitot, J. 1999. Morphological Eidetics for Phenomenology of Perception. In Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, (J. Petitot, F. J. Varela, J.-M. Roy, B. Pachoud, eds.), Stanford, Stanford University Press.

Petitot , J., F. Varela, B. Pachoud and J.M. Roy (eds). 1999. Naturalizing Phenomenology: Contemporary Issues in Phenomenology and Cognitive Science Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Pilat, R. The Problem of 3D Vision in Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (PDF file, 135K). JTB journal, 2002.

Polanyi, Michael. 1965. The structure of consciousness. Brain, Vol. LXXXVIII: 799-810; reprinted in Knowing and Being, ed. M. Grene, London: Routledge, 1969, pp. 211-224.

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Searle, John (1983), Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)

Sharoff, Serge. 1995. Philosophy and cognitive science. Stanford Humanities Review, 4 (2)

Smith, Barry. 1994. Topological Foundations of Cognitive Science, in C. Eschenbach, C. Habel and B. Smith (eds.), Topological Foundations of Cognitive Science, Hamburg: Graduiertenkolleg Kognitionswissenschaft.

Smith, Barry. 1995. Formal Ontology, Common Sense and Cognitive Science," International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 43: 641-667.

Smith, Barry 1995. "Common Sense" in Barry Smith and David W. Smith, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Barry and Casati, Roberto 1994. "Naive Physics: An Essay in Philosophy", Philosphical Psychology, 7, 225-244.

Stawarska, B. 2003. Facial embodiment in 'invisible' imitation. Theoria et Historia Scientiarum: International Journal for Interdisciplinary Studies (Poland). 7, No. 1 (2003).

Stevens, R. 2000. Phenomenological approaches to the study of conscious awareness. In Velmans, M. ed. 2000. Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: New Methodologies and Maps (Amsterdam: John Benjamins), pp. 99-120.

Sutton, John. 2000. Cognitive Science and Phenomenology: Select Bibliography

Thompson, Evan. 2001. Empathy and conciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8 (5-7): 1-32. Reprinted in Between Ourselves: Second-person issues in the study of consciousness,, E. Thompson (ed). Exeter: Imprint Academic, pp. 1-32.

Thompson, Evan, No‘, Alva and Pessoa, Luiz. 1999. Perceptual completion: A case study in phenomenology and cognitive science. In: In J. Petitot, F.J. Varela, J.-M. Roy, and B. Pachoud (Eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (pp. 161-195). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Thompson, Evan and Varela, Francisco. 2001. Radical embodiment: Neural dynamics and consciousness. TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences, 5 (10): 418-25.

van Gelder, Tim (1996-97), 'Wooden iron? Husserlian phenomenology meets cognitive science', The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 4, (1996) Special Issue: Existential Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, edited by Mark Wrathall and Sean Kelly, np. Also in In Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in contemporary phenomenology and cognitive science. J. Petitot, F. Varela, B. Pachoud, J-M Roy eds, Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, pp. 245-65.

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Varela, Francisco. (1999, preprint). The Specious Present : A Neurophenomenology of Time Consciousness. In J. Petitot, F.J. Varela, J.-M. Roy, and B. Pachoud (Eds.), Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (pp. 266-314). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

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Zahavi, Dan. 1999. Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation. Evanston: Northwestern Universitity Press.