Double phenomenology

ABSTRACT – A discussion between phenomenologists and analytic philosophers of mind that took place in 1958 reveals some hidden connections between these two approaches to studying the mind. I argue that we can find two complementary phenomenological methods within this discussion – one that follows along the line of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the other that follows the kind of analysis of speech-acts, avowals and “unstudied speech,” proposed by Ryle and Austin.

KEYWORDS: phenomenology, speech-act, avowal, Austin, Merleau-Ponty, Ryle

Paris and Royaumont

In June 2000, Francisco Varela and I organized a meeting in Paris under the title of Phenomenological and Experimental Approaches to Cognition. The idea was to bring phenomenologists and philosophers of mind together to discuss their interpretations of the recent empirical literature on cognition. The phenomenologists included Yoko Arisaka, Natalie Depraz, Eduard Marbach, Dan Zahavi, Jean Petitot, and myself. The analytic philosophers of mind included José Bermúdez, John Campbell, Naomi Eilan, Tamar Gendler, Güven Güzeldere, and Jean-Michel Roy. Representing science (and medicine) Francisco Varela, Bernard Pachoud, Josef Parnas, and Jonathan Cole were also present. I mention this meeting only to highlight one encounter. José Bermúdez presented a paper entitled “The experienced spatiality of somatic proprioception.” During the question and answer, he received a mild scolding from Dan Zahavi. Zahavi liked what Bermúdez was saying, but, he thought, Bermúdez should have read Husserl on these issues because much of what Bermúdez said could already be found in Husserl’s analysis.

This encounter was reminiscent of a slightly different circumstance at a meeting thirty-two years earlier, in 1958, at nearby Royaumont, a somewhat more philosophically high-powered colloquium on La Philosophie analytique. The aim was to bring European (“continental”) philosophers together with Anglo-American philosophers of mind, and the discussion that ensued focused on the relation between phenomenology and the philosophy of mind. Representatives on the analytic side
included Gilbert Ryle, Alan Gewirth, Bernard Williams, Willard Van
Orman Quine, James Urmson, J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson, A. J. Ayer,
and R. M. Hare. On the loosely defined “continental” side, the phenom-
enologists Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Herman van Breda, Gaston Berger,
and Jean Wahl were present, along with some European based logicians:
Leo Apostel (a student of Carnap), Evert Beth (a student of Tarski),
Józef Bochenski, Philippe Devaux (a student of Whitehead and transla-
tor of Russell and Whitehead). In the opening of this meeting Jean Wahl
quotes José Ferrater Mora to explain that the meeting was intended as a
dialogue between the “badly defined” continental tradition and analytic
philosophy. Other onlookers included Charles Taylor who referred to
this meeting as a “dialogue de sourds” (dialogue of the deaf) (1964, 132),
signifying that there was a lot of talking past one another.¹

Consider the following quotation, written twenty-six years before this
meeting – a description of intentionality.

It is an “essential intuition,” that is, it can be known a priori that all con-
sciousness is consciousness of something. To wish is to wish for something,
to regret is to regret something, to remember, expect, decide and choose
are to remember something, expect something, decide something and
choose something. To every piece of mental functioning there is intrinsi-
cally correlative something which is the ‘accusative’ of that functioning.
But though all consciousness is ‘intentional’ or ‘transitive’, it is not all
intentional or transitive in the same way. The act of remembering may
have the same object as one of regretting, but they are different sorts of
acts and ‘have’ their object in different manners. Moreover, some sorts of
‘consciousness of’ demand others as their platform. I cannot regret with-
out remembering, though I can remember without regretting. And, again,
I cannot remember without having once directly perceived, but I can
perceive without having to remember. And so on.

One might think this is Husserl summarizing a basic tenet of phe-
nomenology. It’s actually from a paper by Ryle (1932, 74). It sounds
like Husserl because Ryle is summarizing Husserl’s position. Twenty-six
years later at Royaumont Ryle presented a paper entitled: “Phenomenol-
ogy versus The Concept of Mind.” In the Q&A, Merleau-Ponty did not
scold Ryle for failing to read Husserl – as is obvious from the above
quote, Ryle had read Husserl and knew what phenomenology was.

¹ The proceedings of this meeting were published in French in Beck 1962; the
English translation of some of the discussion can be found in Merleau-Ponty 1992.
I draw on Vrahimis’s (2013) account of this meeting. Also see Gallagher 2007 and
Overgaard 2010.
Indeed, in his presentation he referred to his own 1949 book, *The Concept of Mind*, as “a sustained essay in phenomenology” (1971, 188). Rather, Merleau-Ponty posed a question that followed on from one posed by A. J. Ayer.

It seems to me [...] that one can legitimately pose some question about the whole ensemble of processes, of manners of being, of actions, of sensations, or of impressions that one cannot consider as objects – let us say – memory; in what does memory consist? Is it essential to reserve this notion to designate only those experiences that are our own? [...] And it is not impossible that this is the genre of research that certain disciples of Husserl recommend, in which case their curiosity seems to me perfectly legitimate. (Ayer, quoted in Merleau-Ponty 1992, 63-64)

Here is Merleau-Ponty’s follow up remark and question:

I have also had the impression, while listening to Mr. Ryle, that what he was saying was not so strange to us [phenomenologists], and that the distance, if there is a distance, is one that he puts between us rather than one I find there [...] I do not see much that separates us [...]. In the last part of his exposition, Mr. Ryle gave us some glimpses of his own research which, for me, is not absolutely a surprise, since I have worked through his *Concept of Mind*. I found here some indications which completely satisfy me, for example, when Mr. Ryle said that the task of a philosopher is never simply to make the inventory of a concept, that the philosopher, when he examines that which is hidden in a word, is led into a complex spider-web of concepts. This appears to me to be profoundly interesting and true. Does this conform to the program of philosophical investigation that Russell posed or that even Wittgenstein posed? This is the question that I asked myself. I submit it to Mr. Ryle certainly not as an objection, but as a request for clarification. (Merleau-Ponty 1992, 67)

Merleau-Ponty’s question was motivated by the fact that Ryle, in his presentation, had gone on and on about Russell and Wittgenstein before he turned to his own work. Merleau-Ponty borrowed the ‘spider-web’ metaphor directly from Ryle’s paper. He agreed that Ryle, even as he distanced himself from Husserl, was actually doing a kind of phenomenology, as Ryle himself indicated. Not only Merleau-Ponty and Ayer, but also Jean Wahl shared this idea.

Last night, when reading Mr. Ryle’s article in particular, I found that for me there were important resemblances between what he thought and what I thought [...]. That deep down, he is not as opposed to phenomenology as he might seem at first sight [...]. Perhaps one day I might meet professor Ryle among the phenomenologists at Leuven; but I am probably wrong? (in Beck 1962, 9-10; translated in Vrahimis 2013, 155-56)
Given how this meeting has been portrayed in subsequent accounts, this seems way too friendly.

Way too friendly? (or WTF?)

Andreas Vrahimis, in his recent book *Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy* (2013), does a great service in clearing up an old controversy. Leslie Beck (1962, 7), in his introduction to the Proceedings of the Royaumont colloquium, suggested that when Merleau-Ponty asked whether Ryle’s program and the phenomenological one were similar, Ryle responded: “I hope not.” This seems more like it – the often repeated oppositional spirit, interpreted as an outright antagonism (see, e.g., Critchley 2001). Ryle’s ‘I certainly hope not’, however, was an attempt to separate himself from Russell and Wittgenstein, not from phenomenology. “Mr. Merleau-Ponty asks me – he kindly transcribed his question for me into English – if I am still strictly in agreement, in my research, with the program outlined at the beginning of the century by Russell and refined by Wittgenstein and some others. My response is: *I certainly hope not!*” (see Vrahimis 2013, 155). He meant this as a general remark, to wit, that philosophers always have to disagree with each other – otherwise, as Ryle suggested, in a kind of paraphrase of Wittgenstein, if we cannot disagree about something then we are reduced to “silence.”

So what did Merleau-Ponty like in Ryle’s presentation and in his book?

- Ryle’s endorsement of Husserl’s anti-psychologism;
- Ryle’s rejection of Husserl’s Platonism;
- Ryle’s critique of the notion of a separate thing called ‘mind’ – or in Husserl’s terminology – the ego. This last point put Ryle closer to two figures who influenced Merleau-Ponty – Sartre and Gurwitsch, who championed a non-egological conception of consciousness.
- Ryle’s thorough-going anti-Cartesianism and his close to behavioristic rejection of body-mind dualism; and at the same time his embrace of the core idea of intentionality – which was an attempt to define with precision the nature of mental states, if taken in the right way, without the accompanying conception of a “mind” as separate entity.

Ryle indicates that *The Concept of Mind* is a phenomenology just insofar as it carries out the sort of intentional analysis that he had summarized, 26 years earlier, as Husserl’s focus. On this latter point he endorses the “examination of multifarious specific mental concepts, such
as those of knowing, learning, discovering, imagining, pretending, hoping, wanting, feeling depressed, feeling a pain, resolving, doing voluntarily, doing deliberately, perceiving, remembering and so on.” And, he continues, “The book [The Concept of Mind] could be described as a sustained essay in phenomenology, if you are at home with that label” (Ryle 1971, 188).

Ryle thought Husserl’s Platonistic phenomenology, his exclusive focus on intuition as method, and the idea of consciousness “puffed up” as first philosophy or transcendental science led Husserl into a “crevasse” or dead end. In contrast, British analytic philosophy simply led to “morasses” from which escape is possible via conceptual analysis, not just intuitive looking (1971, 188). Although he admits that this is a “caricature of Husserl’s Phenomenology” for the sake of contrast, he pinpoints “the wide gulf […] between Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophy” around this point – the focus on logical analysis vs the building of a “super-science.”

Merleau-Ponty would certainly not be in total agreement with everything that Ryle said – especially the caricature of Husserl. Moreover, he was more familiar with Husserl’s less-Platonic unpublished works than Ryle was. He would also disagree with some of Ryle’s own focus. For example, Ryle notes Husserl’s demarcation between philosophy and natural science – something that Merleau-Ponty certainly rethought in his own phenomenology. In this regard Ryle, in contrast with Merleau-Ponty (and quite in contrast with his own student Dennett, who also studied with Quine) wanted no part of the empirical sciences – as indicated in one of his discussion responses at Royaumont:

See here what comes to my mind when speaking of research of fact. Nothing very mysterious, as you see. But what matters is that the questions of fact of this order are not the province of philosophy. One will never say that so and so is a better philosopher than so and so because so and so knows facts of which the other is ignorant. (Ryle, in Beck 1962, 96-97; Merleau-Ponty 1992, 68)

2 Not everything that Ryle says about phenomenology is so polite, and one might think that the following statement is more in line with the traditional construal of the opposition between analytic philosophy and phenomenology: “Phenomenology was, from its birth, a bore. Its oversolemnity of manner more than its equivocal lineage will secure that its lofty claims are ignored” (Ryle 1971, 231).

3 See Brandl 2002 for more on these issues.
Ryle (1971, xi, 188) also associates Husserl with a number of early 20th-century philosophers – Meinong, Frege, Bradley, Peirce, Moore and Russell – and anticipates what was to become the Føllesdal (West Coast) Fregean interpretation of Husserl’s notion of meaning (noema, Sinn) – a theory of meaning framed in terms of “concepts and propositions” – influential for thinkers like Dreyfus (who is critical of Husserl) and Dennett (who studied not only with Ryle and Quine, but studied Husserl with Føllesdal at Harvard). In contrast, one might think that Merleau-Ponty would have favored Gurwitsch’s (“East Coast”) interpretation framed in terms of an analysis of perception rather than conception (see e.g., Drummond 2008; Føllesdal 1969; Zahavi 2004).

**Ryle and Merleau-Ponty**

In the part of Ryle’s paper that Merleau-Ponty liked, Ryle was engaged in conceptual analysis of intentional states – e.g., working out differences between dispositions and actions – not by intuition *ala* Husserl but by thinking about words (specifically verbs) and about how we use them. We could say X … but we could not say Y about a person’s actions, for example. This seems to come close to doing phenomenology by analysis of words, their uses in sentences – all of which shadow concepts and propositions – but more importantly, actions. Ryle gives three examples.

**1) Dispositions and actions**

Ryle makes the following point about dispositions:

Although to say that someone is a cigarette-smoker, is honest or has a good musical ear is not itself to report that he is at a particular moment doing something, still what is said of him is intimately connected with mentions of his particular actions. (Ryle 1971, 198)

He then discusses the observed actions that would amount to justifying what we can say of a person’s disposition, e.g., to smoke, to be honest, to have a musical ear. These are not hidden mental states, but actions that can be perceived.
(2) **Imagination**

In a second analysis, Ryle discusses the concept of imagination as an intentional state. Here Ryle aligns himself with Sartre (vs Hume), and Sartre’s critical analysis of imagination as not hosting images in the head. He confesses, however, that he (Ryle) got a bit lost in his analysis when it came to developing a positive account. Ironically, after rejecting Husserl’s reliance on intuitive seeing, he indicates that he was guided by a much weaker form of intuition – “I felt conceptual embarrassments, and these are always a sure sign that something has gone wrong” (Ryle 1971, 201). Although Ryle continues to admit defeat in this regard, he makes two promising points – both continuing from *The Concept of Mind*.

1. Instead of thinking of pretense as dependent on imagination, think of imagination as a form of pretense – a play-acting.
2. The example of imagining how a tune goes – it requires the person to produce the tune – “using this knowledge; he must be actually thinking how it goes; and he must be thinking how it goes without the tune being actually played aloud to him or hummed aloud by him. He must be thinking how it goes, in its absence” (Ryle 1971, 201). We do what we would do if we were going to hum the tune, but simply stop short of actual humming.

On the one hand, contemporary enactivists, inspired by Merleau-Ponty, would say that imagining is a kind of enacting. They appear to be less stuck than Ryle, about how best to explain this. Evan Thompson, for example, explicitly recognizes (not unlike Ryle’s second point) that simulation may be the way to handle mental imagery, “[W]e could say that to visualize X is to mentally re-present X by subjectively simulating or emulating a neutralized perceptual experience of X” (Thompson 2007, 292). Likewise, Daniel Hutto suggests a simulation-like explanation for imaginings, acknowledging that the

simulation theory of re-creative imagining is attractive because it holds out hope of explaining why imaginings are in many ways similar to perceivings and yet still different from them in others (e.g. vivacity). The best explanation of these facts may well be because imaginings only simulate perceivings but do not replicate them exactly. (Hutto 2015, 76)

Hutto moves us closer to an enactivist account by suggesting that imagining is likely to be strongly constrained by the way that someone engages with the kinds of things that are being imagined (Hutto 2015, 87).
On the other hand, following Ryle’s first suggestion, there is already a good enactivist (fully embodied) analysis of pretense – worked out in terms of pretend play (Rucinska 2014) – that may be helpful in thinking of imagination as pretense. But let’s set the problem of imagination aside⁴, and look at Ryle’s method. If we look at the nature of Ryle’s analysis in this particular case, it is much closer to a Husserlian type of analysis – not via language or language use, but by describing one’s own experience. Clearly this might have been something that Merleau-Ponty felt “at home” with.

(3) Cogito

Ryle’s last bit of analysis in his Royaumont lecture – or what he called the “last specimen of my phenomenology” (202), concerned the cogito – something that Merleau-Ponty had also written about in Phenomenology of Perception (1945/2012). In this case Ryle returns to a concern with the way that we say things – and the discussion is vaguely like Wittgenstein’s discussions found in The Blue and Brown Books (1958), published that same year, but circulating at Oxford earlier than that. “It is present-tense, first-person declarations or ‘avowals’ of mental states and acts that seem to be exempt from any possibility of doubt or mistake” (Ryle 1971, 202). This in contrast to any access we have to others. The idea seems to be that in avowing my experience, I speak not as “an angelically well-situated reporter” on my experience, but simply as the experiencing person. Ryle puzzles about the status of an avowal – a form of speech that expresses my experience – my cogito – in a non-observational way. In The Concept of Mind he has a clearer account that we’ll return to. Nothing gets resolved here about the Cogito – Ryle presents it as a puzzle – an issue that Merleau-Ponty was himself critically rethinking at the same time.

At the time of Royaumont Merleau-Ponty was engaged in writing his last work, The Visible and the Invisible, which was published posthumously. Merleau-Ponty writes in a way consistent with what Ryle was saying at Royaumont: “The cogito as an experience of my own being is a prereflective cogito, it does not pose my own being as an object before me” (1968, 56) – i.e., it is non-observational. Merleau-Ponty thinks further about this, criticizing his own earlier analysis of the ‘tacit cogito’ – in one of his famously, sketchy and incomplete “working notes” – this

⁴ For more on this issue, see Gallagher, in press.
one written not long after Royaumont – January 1959, that is, not long after he listened to Ryle’s brief puzzle about the cogito.

The Cogito of Descartes (reflection) is an operation on significations, a statement of relations between them (and the significations themselves sedimented in acts of expression). It therefore presupposes a prereflective contact of self with self (the non-thetic consciousness [of self – Sartre) or a tacit cogito (being close by oneself)—this is how I reasoned in Ph. P.’

Is this correct? What I call the tacit cogito is impossible. To have the idea of “thinking” (in the sense of the “thought of seeing and of feeling”) [...]. it is necessary to have words. It is by the combination of words (with their charge of sedimented significations, which are in principle capable of entering into other relations than the relations that have served to form them). (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 170)

And in a note one month later, Merleau-Ponty is still wrestling with the relation between the pre-reflective, tacit cogito and speech.

It is indeed the speaking [...] that aims at the other as a behavior, not as a “psychism” [i.e., as a hidden mental state], [and] that responds to the other before he would have been understood as “psychism,” in a confrontation that repels or accepts his utterances as utterances, as events [...]. The tacit Cogito does not, of course, solve these problems. In disclosing it as I did in Ph.P. I did not arrive at a solution ([because] my chapter on the Cogito is not connected with the chapter on speech). (Merleau-Ponty 1968, 175)

Merleau-Ponty goes on to make a distinction between the tacit cogito and the “language cogito” (1968, 179), and then distinguishes both from the Cartesian (reflective) cogito.

As with Ryle at Royaumont, it remains a puzzle – it’s not clear in any of this whether Merleau-Ponty was talking about methodology (of how we discover ourselves pre-reflectively, reflectively, or via language), or ontologically (i.e., whether one of these phenomena is more basic).

Returning to Ryle’s The Concept of Mind, we find a clearer discussion of avowals and “unstudied speech.” When someone unleashes an instance of unstudied speech, we are seemingly able to gain access to his “frame of mind.” In the case of a person who is annoyed with a knotted shoelace, for example, “What he says, together with his way of saying it, discloses or lets us know his frame of mind [...].” Unstudied utterances are not reports on a frame of mind — rather, similar to what Merleau-Ponty says of speech — that it accomplishes thought — unstudied utterances just are the frame of mind expressed. “Now many unstudied utterances embody explicit interest phrases, or what I have elsewhere been
calling ‘avowals’, like ‘I want’, ‘I hope’, ‘I intend’…” These are not self-reports. They have a performative function: “[...] in its primary employment ‘I want …’ is not used to convey information, but to make a request or demand” (Ryle 1949, 183).

A person who notices the unstudied utterances of a speaker, who may or may not be himself, is, if his interest in the speaker has the appropriate direction, [...] especially well situated to pass comments upon the qualities and frames of mind of their author. (Ryle 1949, 184)

The question we come to in all of this: if my interest has the appropriate direction, and the speaker is myself, am I thereby doing phenomenology? Even if the speaker is someone other than myself, might I find a method here for doing a second-person phenomenology?5

How to do phenomenology with words

Another of the participants at Royaumont was J. L. Austin who, three years earlier had given the 1955 William James Lectures at Harvard. Austin died in 1960, a year before Merleau-Ponty died, and two years before his lectures were published as How to Do Things with Words (1962). For Austin the idea of a performative utterance or speech act is “by saying something, we do something.” Here is how he put it in one of his essays.

When we examine what we should say when, what words we should use in what situations, we are looking again not merely at words (or ‘meanings’, whatever they may be) but also at the realities we use the words to talk about: we are using a sharpened awareness of words to sharpen our perception of, though not as the final arbiter of, the phenomena. For this reason I think it might be better to use, for due way of doing philosophy, some less misleading name than [‘linguistic’ or ‘analytic’ philosophy] – for instance, ‘linguistic phenomenology’, only that is rather a mouthful. (Austin 1979, 182)6

5 On the notion of a second-person phenomenology, see e.g., Churchill 2010, Crowell 2015, Gallagher 2012, Petitmengin 2006.

6 This is close to what Austin says at Royaumont: “we use the multiplicity of expressions with which the richness of our language furnishes us in order to direct our attention to the multiplicity and the richness of our experiences. Language serves us as interpreter for observing the living facts which constitute our experience, which, without it, we would tend to overlook [...] This means that language illumines for us the complexity of life” (in Beck 1962, 333, trans. in Overgaard 2010).
At Royaumont Austin presented his linguistic phenomenology in the distinction between performative and constative (declarative) utterances. Constatives represent and have truth conditions. Performatives enact—they do things. Examples of performatives are illocutionary acts that have a certain force or effect: ‘I warn you’, ‘I order you to…’; and perlocutionary acts which accomplish something just in uttering it, e.g., ‘Surprise!’ Ryle’s notions of avowals and “unstudied speech” could easily count as examples of these sorts of speech acts. The idea, for both Austin and Ryle, is that the use of a word, if it works well to accomplish something, will mark off something of significance in the speaker’s experience.

If we put the phenomenologies of Ryle and Austin together with Merleau-Ponty’s chapter on speech in the *Phenomenology of Perception*, where he says “language accomplishes thought,” it does not seem beyond the pale to take seriously the idea that a certain type of analytic philosophy could count as a linguistic phenomenology. Others have suggested a link of this sort between Austin and continental philosophy (e.g., Lanigan 1977; TeHennepe 1965; van Peursen 1972).

Robert Arrington (1975), however, argues against it. Arrington takes issue with Austin’s proposed methodology for linguistic phenomenology, which Austin describes as prising “words off the world, to hold them apart from and against it, so that we can realize their inadequacies and arbitrariness, and can re-look at the world without blinkers” (1970, 130). Arrington sees this as contradictory.

1. We are to prise words off the world to escape the inadequate and arbitrary linguistic blinkers.
2. We are supposed to grasp the realities and distinctions in the world by looking at the use of words in speech acts.

Austin can’t have it both ways. Moreover, if we can look at the world directly, as in (1), why bother with (2).

I want to suggest that rather than see this as contradictory, it is possible to see this as a *double phenomenology* that reveals more than any

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7 Brandl (2002) does not address this specific connection with Austin but argues generally against trying to see a methodological continuity between phenomenology and analytic philosophy of mind.
single phenomenology – realistically assuming that no phenomenology is perfect and, following Merleau-Ponty, that there is no complete phenomenological reduction.

Consider the first method:

1. We are to prise words off the world to escape the inadequate and arbitrary linguistic blinkers.

This reflects a more Husserlian approach where the phenomenological reduction is intended to get us to a presuppositionless intuition of experience and the world as it is framed by our intentional acts. Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that this Husserlian idea of gaining access to mute experience is at odds with the idea of the Vienna Circle, namely, that we can relate only to significations – thus he says, “logical positivism is the antithesis of Husserl’s thought.” Husserl’s approach, however, has been questioned even within the close bounds of phenomenology. First, by Merleau-Ponty himself, who contends that the phenomenological reduction is always incomplete – due to a variety of existential issues having to do with intersubjectivity and embodiment – the fact that we are bodily in-the-world and in-the-world-with-others. “The most important lesson of the reduction is the impossibility of a complete reduction” (1945/2012, lxxvii). Second, by a hermeneutical critique that rightly points to the necessity of using language even as we work out our phenomenological descriptions – language introduces biases, and as Austin suggests, inadequacies and arbitrariness.

Still, as Merleau-Ponty suggests, this does not mean that we give up the phenomenological reduction. The fact that we are bodies in-the-world with others (and that we are not absolute spirits, or in Ryle’s phrase, ‘angelically well-situated reporters’) continues to be the motivation for attempting to effect the reduction, no matter how imperfect it may be. Thus, Merleau-Ponty remarks, “far from being, as was believed,
the formula for an idealist philosophy, the phenomenological reduction is in fact the formula for an existential philosophy: Heidegger’s ‘In-der-Welt-Sein’ only appears against the background of the phenomenological reduction” (1945/2012, lxxviii).

Given the imperfection of the first method, we can find motivation for pursuing the second part of a double phenomenology.

2. We are supposed to grasp the realities and distinctions in the world by looking at the use of words in speech acts.

Merleau-Ponty recognized this motivation too, even before Royau-mont, in his 1953 publication, Prose of the World: “The more energetic our intention to see the things themselves, the more the appearances by which they are expressed and the words by which we express them will be interposed between the things and us” (1963, 20).

Rather than seeing this as contrary to phenomenology, contrary to Husserl’s program, or a contradiction in Austin’s program (as Arrington suggested), this second phenomenology can address the inadequacies of the first one. Again, my suggestion is that we double down on phenomenology by putting the Ryle-Austin analytic of speech-acts, avowals and “unstudied speech” – our in-the-world, enactive use of language – in a tandem relation with the Husserlian variety. Whether this double phenomenology was envisioned by Merleau-Ponty, Ryle, or Ayer is unclear; but it is not inconsistent with itself, or with the suggestions to be found in their discussions.9

9 Husserl himself may have envisioned some version of this double phenomenology. In the Logical Investigations he outlined a method of working out an “a priori grammar” of possible forms of meaning that Ryle put to use in the logical analysis of mental concepts and their expressions by detailing their “logical geography” (Ryle 1949, 7). Thomasson (2002) demonstrates a continuity between Husserl and Ryle on this issue and the employment of a methodology of “nonsense detection” (125). Husserl, however, pursued a somewhat different methodology in working out his transcendental phenomenology, whereas Ryle focused more on logical grammar and developed the related idea of a category mistake. As Thomasson puts it, “while Husserl laid out the method programmatically (providing what Ryle calls his ‘pots and pans’ of method), Ryle demonstrated how to make philosophical ‘pudding’ with it” (2002, 127-28; citing Ryle 1971, 223). The analysis of speech acts (avowals and unstudied speech) is something like a Wittgensteinian (or as Thomasson argues, a Heideggerian) extension of this type of analysis. “Concepts are not things that are there crystallized in a splendid isolation; they are discriminable features, but not detachable atoms, of what is integrally said or integrally thought […] To examine them is to examine the live force of things that we actually say. It is to examine them not in retirement, but doing their cooperative work” (1971, 185).
From this perspective perhaps we can make better sense of Ryle’s advice to his student, Dennett. Dennett explains that “Gilbert Ryle, who was himself a masterful scholar of Husserl and Phenomenology […] when we discussed my own work on intentionality […] certainly didn’t encourage me to follow him in attempting to plumb the depths of the Continental Husserlians” (Dennett 1996, np). That’s because there was an alternative phenomenology that Dennett could have pursued – perhaps not unrelated to the heterophenomenology that he did pursue. Also, of course, from this perspective, Zahavi’s scolding of Bermúdez to read Husserl may not have been fully justified.

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